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Abstract—In this paper we evaluate the performance of
DataCube a P2P persistent data storage platform. This plat-
form exploits the properties of cluster-based peer-to-peer struc-
tured overlays together with a hybrid redundancy schema (a
compound of light replication and rateless erasure coding)
to guarantee durable access and integrity of data despite
adversarial attacks. The triptych "availability - storage over-
head - bandwidth usage" is evaluated, and results show that
despite massive attacks and high churn, DataCube performs
remarkably well. We evaluate the performance of the rateless
erasure codes implemented in DataCube. Our exploration
shows how parameters selection impacts codes performance
mainly in terms of decoding time, and collect strategies.
Keywords-Peer-to-peer, Replication, Persistence, Evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The huge interest for peer-to-peer systems has motivated
researchers to go beyond routing and look-up functional-
ities. Over the last past five years, peer-to-peer systems
have emerged as a viable architecture for implementing
persistent data-storage systems. However, two challenges
need to be addressed to successfully build efficient persis-
tent data-storage systems. First overcoming the extremely
heterogeneous nodes availabilities (essentially due to nodes
intermittent or transient connectivity) [1] and second facing
nodes untrustworthiness [2]. Regarding the first challenge, it
is well known that storage overhead incurred by the storing
of full data replicas and bandwidth needed to recreate new
copies upon unpredictable join and leave of nodes tend to
overwhelm the benefits of replication [1], i.e., its ease of im-
plementation and its low download latency overhead [3], [4],
[5]. In contrast, erasure coding provides redundancy without
the overhead of replication. In particular, recently proposed
rateless erasure codes (also called Fountain codes) [6], [7],
[8], as a class of erasure codes provide natural resilience to
losses, and make them fully adapted to dynamic systems.
By being rateless, they give rise to the generation of ran-
dom, and potentially unlimited number of uniquely coded
symbols. A clear advantage of that property is that content
reconciliation is useless and one may recover an initial object
by collecting coded blocks generated by different sources.
An increasing number of P2P persistent data-storage sys-
tems exploit erasure coding to provide data persistence,
as Total Recall [9], Reperasure [10], and Carbonite [11],
however facing nodes untrustworthiness is still challenging.
OceanStore [12], [13] implements a hybrid redundancy
scheme. By massively applying fixed-rate erasure coding to
all data objects, OceanStore guarantees data persistence as
long as undesirable (a.k.a. Byzantine) nodes do not collude
together. Indeed, collusion of malicious nodes allow to easily
mount targeted attacks that very quickly may disconnect
targeted nodes from the rest of the system [14]. Actually
holding a logarithmic number of IP addresses is sufficient
to perform such an attack [15].
In a prior paper [16], we have presented a P2P per-
sistent data-storage architecture. This architecture, called
DataCube, guarantees durable access and integrity of data
despite collusion of malicious nodes. This is achieved by
combining a compound of full replication and rateless
erasure coding schemes with the properties of cluster-based
structured overlays. Briefly, each data-item is replicated at
a small subset of nodes gathered together in a cluster, such
that the set of clusters form the vertices of the structured
graph. This replication schema guarantees that in presence
of a bounded number of malicious nodes, data integrity
is guaranteed through Byzantine agreement protocols, and
efficient data retrieval is preserved (retrieval is achieved in
O(logN) hops and requires O(logN) messages, with N
the current number of nodes in the system). In addition
to this replication schema, data is fragmented, coded and
spread outside its original cluster. Each fragment is uniquely
identified and is placed at the cluster that matches its new
identifier. This coding schema guarantees that in presence
of targeted attacks (i.e., the adversary manages to adaptively
mount collusion against specific clusters of nodes), recovery
of the data those clusters were in charge of is self-triggered.
In the present work, we evaluate the efficiency of Dat-
aCube. First, we evaluate the encoding and decoding per-
formance of the rateless erasure codes implemented in
DataCube. Our exploration seeks to understand which fea-
tures and parameters lead to good coding performance.
As will be shown, parameters selection impacts how well
codes perform mainly in terms of recovering overhead, and
decoding time. In particular we show that the order in
which coded blocks are collected has a strong impact of the
decoding time. Second, we perform an in-depth evaluation
of DataCube in terms of storage and bandwidth overhead,
and data availability. This analysis is conducted by assuming
an extreme adversarial context (some corners of the system
are populated by up to 45% of malicious nodes, while the
proportion of malicious nodes in the rest of the system may
reach up to 30%), and a highly overloaded system (up to
1000 Tbytes are pushed in a system of 106 nodes, which
roughly corresponds to the maintenance of a very large video
archive). Results of this evaluation clearly demonstrate the
benefit of hybrid replication over full replication in terms of
data availability and storage overhead. It also demonstrate
that according to nodes churn, the bandwidth usage per node
is negligible in practice.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion I-A presents the principles of online coding. Section II
describes DataCube main design principles. This section has
been introduced for self-containment reasons. Section III
presents the performance evaluation of the encoder and
decoder implemented in DataCube. Section IV presents an
analysis of data availability, storage overhead, and total
bandwidth maintenance. Section V presents related works,
and Section VI concludes.
A. Principles of Online Coding
Online codes [7] are based on two main system parameters
ε, and q. Parameter ε, typically equal to 0.01, infers how
many blocks are needed to recover the original message (i.e.,
a message of n blocks can with very probability be decoded
from (1 + ε)n check blocks) while q affects the probability
of reconstructing the original message (i.e., the decoding
process may fail with negligeable probability (ε/2)q+1, with
q typically equal to 3 [7]). Online coding consists in three
phases respectively called pre-coding, coding and decoding
phases. Consider an original message (or data item) divided
into n equal-sized input blocks.
The pre-coding phase consists in generating a small
number A = δεqn of auxiliary blocks, with δ typically
equal to .55, and by appending them to the original message.
Specifically, for each original input block bi we associate q
randomly chosen numbers i1, . . . , iq with ij ∈ [1, . . . , A]
such that each auxiliary block aij is computed by XOR-ing
the content of all the input blocks we have associated it to.
The A auxiliary blocks are then appended to the original n
blocks message to form the so called composite message F ′
of size n′ = n(1 + δεq) which is suitable for coding.
The coding phase consists in generating check blocks ci
from the composite message F ′. Specifically, check block
ci is generated by XOR-ing the content of di blocks of the
composite message, with di a value sampled from a pre-
specified probability distribution F that depends on ε [7].
The check block is then the pair 〈ci, xi〉 with xi the set of
the positions (also called adjacencies or neighbours) of the
di blocks randomly chosen from F
′ to compute check block
ci. A possibly infinite number of independent check blocks
can be generated this way. In DataCube a pseudo-random
number generator function G(.) to sample di is used which
allows different sources to generate exactly the same ci (see
Section II-C). Any set of (1 + ε)n′ output checks blocks
are sufficient to recover a fraction 1− ε/2 of the composite
message which guarantees to recover the original message
with probability 1− (ε)q+1.
Decoding amounts in rebuilding the bipartite graph com-
posed by all recovered blocks 〈ci, xi〉 and its adjacencies
xi. An adjacent block (also called neighbour) is a block
in the set xi XOR-ed to produce each check block. In the
bipartite graph the decoding algorithm continously looks
for received check blocks with only one unknown adjacent
block. It recovers the adjacent composite block by XOR-ing
the check blocks and all adjacents. Hence, check blocks with
adjacence-degree 1 are direct copies of the corresponding
composite block. At each round, any recovered composite
block increases the probability of recovering other blocks
through its edges. Input blocks are recovered from recovered
composite blocks likewise.
II. PRINCIPLES OF DATACUBE
A. DataCube Design
DataCube implements a hybrid replication schema (a
compound of light full replication and rateless erasure cod-
ing). This replication schema relies on a cluster-based DHT
substrate. Cluster-based substrates (also called overlays) are
specifically designed to be resistant to nodes dynamics by
pushing the impact of churn at clusters levels so that the
overall topology is barely impacted, and to efficiently toler-
ate malicious peers by running Byzantine-tolerant agreement
protocols among clusters nodes. Specifically, cluster-based
DHT overlays mainly consist in the clusterized version of
DHT overlays, where groups of peers substitute peers at
the vertices of the graph. These groups of peers, typically
called swarms [17], [15], clusters [18], and cliques [19], and
buckets [20] are populated by peers that are close to each
other according to a given proximity metricsR. This metrics
can be logical (as in [17], [15], [18], [20]), or geographical
(as in [19]). These clusters form the vertices of the structured
topology. Clusters in the system are uniquely labelled,
and their size is lower (resp. upper) bounded. The lower
bound, named Smin in the following, usually satisfies some
constraint based on the assumed failure model. For instance
Smin ≥ 4 allows Byzantine tolerant agreement protocols
to be run among these Smin nodes. The upper bound, that
we call Smax in the following, is typically in O(logN) to
meet scalability requirements, with N the current number
of nodes in the system. All cluster members or only a
subset of them are in charge of routing lookup requests,
replicating all data-items that match the cluster label, and
handling cluster operations (split/merge and create). These
features vary according to the specificities of the cluster-
based overlays. DataCube design assumes that Smin peers
are in charge of these operations. These peers are called
core members of a cluster. The other peers of the cluster (if
any) are inactive until they replace left core members. These
peers are called spare members of the cluster. This level
of data replication is sufficient to guarantee durable access
and integrity of any data that has been stored in the system
provided that at any time and anywhere in the system a
fraction of at most µ.n malicious nodes surround any subset
of n non malicious peers, with µ < 1/3. Now, to tolerate
targeted attacks, DataCube exploits the properties of rateless
erasure codes. Thus, in addition to being replicated at core
members, data is coded and spread outside its cluster. The
following two sections are dedicated to the description of
both points.
B. Pushing Check Blocks in the System
Figure 1 shows the coding and spreading algorithm.
Specifically, when core member p ∈ C receives data-
item D, p generates a composite message (as explained
in Section I-A) and its associated Merkle root [21] (see
lines 1–6). Then p invokes a Byzantine tolerant consensus
agreement among core members to agree on a unique
composite message and Merkle root (line 7). The Merkle
hash tree is an authentication scheme based on a tree of
hashes that eliminates the large storage requirement by using
a single signature (called root of the tree) for authenticating
a finite number of messages. The consensus agreement
eliminates the possibility of using a corrupted composite
message during the coding phase. Finally, the Merkle root
guarantees that only consistent composite blocks are used
during the decoding phase. Once an agreement is achieved
among core members, the coding phase is invoked by each
core member.
In the Coding phase, c0 check blocks are initially gen-
erated (lines 9–17), with c0 = (1 + ε)n
′. Note that more
check blocks can be generated afterwards (this occurs when
the α spare members s1, . . . , sα of cluster C
′ at which a
specific check block is stored collude together to alter the
integrity of that check block. In that case, core members
of C′ invoke the codeBlock function (lines 9–11)). Func-
tion generateCheckBlock implements the generation
of each check block according to Section I-A. At round j,
the adjacencies xj of check block 〈cj , xj〉 are derived from
G(key(D) + j), with key(D) + j the seed of the pseudo-
random number generator G(.). The rationale of using G(.)
is that it guarantees that all core members generate exactly
the same check block at each coding round without any
synchronization among them. Each check block is assigned a
key from which the placement on DataCube is defined. Keys
must be random (to prevent malicious nodes from devising
strategies to generate them), but their retrieval, for decoding,
must not involve any storage overhead. Thus, DataCube
exploits the hash-chain method [22] to identify check blocks.
Each key assigned to a generated check block results from
a recursive application of a hash function H on the data-
item, establishing a chain (or stream) of keys. Specifically,
given a data-item D and its associated key(D)=H(D), then
key cBn of check block 〈cn, xn〉 is equal to H
(n)(key(D)),
with H(n)(key(D)) the nth recursive application of the hash
function H on key(D) (line 14).
Upon receipt put(D) do
1: key(D) ← hash(D);
2: cMsg[] ← preCode(D);
3: foreach (composite block j ∈ cMsg) do
4: merkleLeafSet[j] ← H(cMsg[j]);
5: enddo;
6: merkleRoot← building of the Merkle tree on merkleLeafSet[];
7: 〈cMsg′,merkleRoot′〉 ← run consensus on (cMsg, merkleRoot)
among core members;
8: invoke codeBlock(key(D),cMsg′,merkleRoot′,1,c0);
enddo;
Upon invocation codeBlock(key,cMsg,merkleRoot,b,c0) do
9: if(cMsg = null ∨ merkleRoot = null) then
10: cMsg ← key.getAgreedcMsg();
11: merkleRoot← key.getAgreedMerkleRoot();
12: for (i = b to b+ c0) do
13: 〈ci, xi〉 ← generateCheckBlock(key,cMsg,G(key + i),i);
14: cBi ← H
(i)(key);
15: put(cBi, 〈ci, xi〉, key) at α spare members of the closest cluster
to cBi;
16: enddo;
17: register(key,merkleRoot) at neighbour clusters of C if not
already done;
enddo;
Upon receipt put(cBi, 〈ci, xi〉, key) do
18: if (p.spareView.length ≥ α) then
19: αList[] ← p.getClosestSpare(α, cBi);
20: foreach (spare member i ∈ αList[]) do
21: p sends (STORE, (cBi, 〈ci, xi〉)) to αList[i];
22: p.spareView[i].addCheck(cBi,H(〈ci, xi〉), key);
23: enddo;
24: else p broadcasts (STORE, (cBi, 〈ci, xi〉)) to p’s core set;
enddo;
Figure 1: Algorithm Run by any Core Member p
Each check block 〈ci, xi〉 is then pushed at α ≥ 2 spare
members of cluster Ck, with Ck the closest cluster to cBi,
with cBi the key of 〈ci, xi〉 (line 18). These α spares are
determined according to some arbitrary but deterministic
function (e.g., the α spares are the closest spares to cBi)
(line 19). Replicating check blocks at α spares members
increases the resilience to failures. The only case for which
a new check block 〈cj , xj〉 has to be generated is when all
α spare members simultaneously leave or collude. Note that
when there are less than α spare members in the cluster,
check blocks are temporarily stored at core members (line
25). Core members of Ck compute and store a fingerprint
of 〈ci, xi〉 by applying a one-way hash function on it (line
22). This fingerprint is used by cluster Ck to guarantee the
integrity of check blocks stored at its spare members. Finally,
each core member p ∈ C registers the keys of all data-item
D that are cached at C at the set of clusters C′, such that C
is a direct neighbour of C′.
C. Selective Collect of Check Blocks
When a cluster C is detected corrupted recovery of the
data cluster C was in charge of is triggered. Corruption de-
tection is achieved through simple integrity tests performed
by the neighbours of C. Description of this procedure is out
of the scope of the paper however the interested reader is
invited to read the companion paper for more details [16].
In the following we assume that core members of cluster C′
trigger the recovery of data-itemD (i.e., cluster C′ is a neigh-
bour of C). Cluster C′ has to collect sufficiently many check
blocks (at least c0 = n(1+ ε)(1+ δεq)) so that D recovery
is guaranteed with probability 1− (ε)q+1 (see Section I-A).
Specifically, let key(D) be the key corresponding to data-item
D. From the hash-chain mechanism applied to key(D), C′
derives the keys of all the check blocks that are going to be
collected, namely cB1 . . . cBj , with cBj = H
(j)(key(D))
and j = (1 + ε)n(1 + δεq), and from G(.) C′ generates
x1 . . . xj , the respective adjacencies of cB1 . . . cBj . From
this initial step, C′ has the opportunity to apply different
strategies to collect check blocks, these strategies differing
according to the priority given to the adjacencies degree.
In the first strategy C′ asks for cB1 . . . cBj in any order,
that is whatever their adjacencies degrees (this strategy is
referred as to the random strategy in the following). In
the second one, C′ asks for check blocks such that the
decoding process can get started upon receipt of the first
check blocks. Specifically C′ asks for all degree-one check
blocks first and then, for the remaining check blocks, asks
for them in any order. This policy is called degree-one-first-
random-afterwards in the following. In the third one, C′ asks
for check blocks such that each one effectively contributes
to recover the initial data. That is all degree-one check
blocks cB11 . . . cB1i are asked for first, then check blocks
whose degree are reduced to one thanks to cB11 . . . cB1i are
asked for and so on until recovery of the initial data D is
completed. This third policy is referred as to the degree-one-
only strategy in the following.
III. CODING AND DECODING PERFORMANCE
In this section we evaluate the encoding and decoding
performance of the rateless erasure code implemented in
DataCube. Our exploration seeks to understand which fea-
tures and parameters lead to good coding performance.
A. Setup Experiments
The experiments presented in this section have been
performed in the following context: Different sizes of data
files have been evaluated, ranging from small ones (i.e., 10
KBytes) to large ones (i.e., 1 MBytes) and for each data
file, it has been fragmented in 100 blocks. Regarding the
encoder parameters, different values of ǫ have been set,
namely, ǫ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9. Finally, the decoder
has been fed with the random, the degree-one-first-random-
afterwards and the degree-one-only strategies. All the plotted
results are obtained from the averaging of 50 independent
experiments.
Figure 2 exhibits the fraction of recovered input blocks
as a function of the normalised number of collected check
blocks (The normalised number of collected blocks is cal-
culated as the number of collected check blocks divided by
c0). According to these experiments, for small values of ǫ
(i.e., ǫ < 0.1) the number of check blocks that need to be
collected to successfully recover the original data files is
around twice the value of c0, although this number is less
than or equal to c0 for larger values of ǫ (i.e., ǫ ≥ 0.1).
Actually, for large data files (i.e., 1 MBytes), the original
data file can be recovered with only 0.8× ǫ which tends to
demonstrate that for large files, c0 value is over estimated.
Figure 3 shows the decoding time as a function of the data
files sizes for the different strategies described here above.
The curves clearly demonstrate that the collect strategy is
a critical part of the design. Indeed, strategy degree-one-
only overpasses the two other ones whatever the size of
the data file and for any values of ǫ. Thus, this collect
strategy combined with the probability distribution F [7]
fully exploits the properties of the coding by guaranteeing
that i) many check blocks have a low degree so that they
can be used for decoding the other checked blocks, and ii)
these low-degree checked blocks are the first ones to be
collected so that the decoding process progresses steadily,
without requiring any useless XOR operations.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DATACUBE
This section is devoted to the analysis of the data availabil-
ity guaranteed by DataCube and the associated incurred stor-
age and bandwidth usage requirements. Note that numerical
values of the parameters used in the experiments are drawn
from PeerCube features [18], in particular the derivation
of the number of independent routes. Finally, differently
from the above analysis, we assume a severe adversarial
environment (at least 30% of the population is malicious).
A. Data Availability
In the following, we analyse the availability of data-item
D. We assume that D sits at cluster C, and each of the
i generated check blocks have been spread on clusters Ci,
where c0 ≤ i ≤ cb, with cb the number of generated check
blocks needed to reach a given data availability (as derived
later in this section). For simplicity reasons, we assume that
each check block sits on a different cluster. By construction,
D availability depends on both cluster C availability where
the Smin replicas of D sit and on the availability of the
clusters on which check blocks are located. Let µ denote the
ratio of malicious nodes in the whole system. The probability
pp that cluster D is polluted is equal to the probability
that its core set is polluted, that is, populated by more
than ⌊(Smin − 1)/3⌋ malicious nodes. In the following we
consider the upper bound of pp which is obtained when the
(a)
(b)
Figure 2: Fraction of input blocks recovered as a function of
the number of check blocks received over c0 for data file size
equal to 100 KBytes (case (a)), and equal to 1 MBytes (case (b)).
number of clusters in the system is minimal, i.e. equal to
⌈N/Smax⌉. Let Y denote the random variable representing
the number of malicious nodes in a given core set, and X
the one depicting their number in the cluster then
pp = 1−
⌊(Smin−1)/3⌋∑
y=0
⌊(µ.N)⌋∑
x=0
P{Y = y|X = x}P{X = x}.
Probability P{Y = y|X = x} represents the probability
that y malicious nodes are inserted in the core knowing that
x are in the whole cluster, i.e.,
P{Y = y|X = x} =
(
x
y
)(
Smax − x
Smin − y
)
/
(
Smax
Smin
)
,
(a)
(b)
Figure 3: Decoding time (milliseconds) as a function of data
files sizes (Bytes) for (a) ǫ = 0.05 and (b) ǫ = 0.9.
and
P{X = x} =
(
µN
x
)
(Smax/N)
x(1− Smax/N)
µN−x.
The lower bound ph on the probability that a request issued
from cluster D successfully reaches cluster Ci located at h
hops from C and is successfully handled by Ci is equal to
ph = 1− (1− (1− pp)
h)r,
where r is the number of independent paths the request can
take. It has been proven in [18] that log(N/Smax) ≤ r ≤
log(N/Smax) + 3 and 1 ≤ h ≤ log(N/Smax) + 5. We are
ready to derive the availability da of D.
da = (1− pp) + pp
cb∑
c0
(
cb
c0
)
(ph)
c0 (1− ph)
cb−c0 .
Table I provides a comparison between the stretch factor
of our policy (i.e., the total amount redundancy added to
data-items which is equal to cb over c0) and the replication
factor imposed by classical full replication required to get
data availability at least greater than 0.9, 0.99, and 0.999.
To compute the replication factor obtained with classical
full replication, we suppose that each copy of the data-
item is replicated on a different cluster, as supposed for
check blocks. Experiments are conducted for different sizes
N of the system. Let Smax = ⌈log2N⌉. In all these
experiments, we assume that h is maximal (i.e. we maximise
the probability of encountering faulty clusters). For example
for N = 1, 000, we have h = 11 hops. Finally, we assume
that 30% of the nodes in the system are malicious (e.g. for
N = 1, 000, ph = 0.076). However, to simulate a targeted
attack at cluster C (the cluster on which D sits), we suppose
that C is populated by µtarget = 45% of malicious nodes.
Results of these experiments, given in Table I, show the
benefit of our approach over full replication. It is shown
that for reaching different levels of availability, the required
stretch factor increases relatively smoothly, while the grow-
ing of the replication factor is more sensitive. For instance,
for N = 1, 000, and c0 = 50, the stretch factor is equal to
17, 02 for an availability of .99 and reaches a stretch factor
of 18, 92 for an availability equal to 0.999%. Whereas in the
same conditions, the replication factor increases from 51 to
80 which clearly becomes a problem for large data-items.
The same trend is obtained for increasing values of N .
N Stretch factor Replication factor
0.9 0.99 0.999 0.9 0.99 0.999
1,000 14.42 17.02 18.92 22 51 80
2,000 17.92 21.14 23.52 27 63 100
3,000 17.96 21.18 23.56 27 64 100
4,000 22.24 26.26 29.2 34 79 124
5,000 22.28 26.3 29.24 34 79 125
Table I: Comparaison of the stretch factor in DataCube and the
replication factor obtained in classical full replication as a function of
the required availability and the number of nodes N in the system. In
these experiments, the ratio of malicious nodes in C is equal to 45% while
it is equal to 30% in the remaining of the system.
Figure 4(a) confirms the scalability of our approach. For
all these experiments we have c0 = 50, µ = 30 and
µtarget = 40%. For N = 2
16, rather than a replication
factor of 194, we achieve the same availability with a 3-fold
savings by relying on hybrid replication. Finally, one can
notice the impressive benefit when using independent routes
on both approaches. For instance, for r = 6 and N = 28,
replication factor decreases to 33 while in our solution the
stretch factor drops to 10.
B. Storage Overhead
We now compute the storage overhead implied by Dat-
aCube. We recall that each data-item D is initially replicated
at Smin core members and n fragments generated from D
are coded and spread to other clusters at α spare members.
The storage overhead DS for D is given by:
DS = ⌈(n.Smin + c0
cb
c0
α)⌉ − n. (1)
We now estimate how this storage overhead is distributed
among nodes in DataCube. First, remark that data-items
identifiers are randomly assigned for both data-items and
check blocks. Thus, we can interpret the placement of both
data-items and check blocks as the throwing of balls into
several urns. We denote by Zc (resp. Zs) the random variable
representing the total number of data-items (resp. check
blocks) stored at each core (resp. spare) member. Let f
be the total number of data-items in the system, cb be the
number of check blocks generated for each D to get a target
data availability, and N = Nc +Ns be the current number
of nodes in DataCube—Nc (resp. Ns) is the number of core
(resp. spare) members. The probability that the number of
data-items (resp. check blocks) at any core (resp. spare) is
upper bounded by z is given by:
P (Zs,c ≤ z) =
z∑
k=0
(
f.DSs,c
k
)(
1
Ns,c
)k (
1−
1
Ns,c
)f.DSs,c−k
,
where the notation Xs,c stands for Xs when dealing with
check blocks and Xc for data-items. In particular, DSs =
c0
cb
c0
α and DSc = n.Smin. Figure 4(b) compares the
number of fragments per node (core and spare member) in
DataCube with the one needed in case of full replication
and pure rateless erasure coding to guarantee an availability
of 0.99. Recall that data-items are made of n fragments. In
these experiments, N = 1, 000, c0 = 50, the stretch factor
is equal to 10 (see Figure 4(a)), and α = 2. Lessons learnt
from these experiments are two-fold: first, our approach
guarantees a 3.5-fold savings wrt full replication, and second
is very close to pure rateless erasure coding approach which
clearly shows the low impact on storage overhead of the full
data-items stored at Smin core members in DataCube.
C. Bandwidth Usage
We finally derive the total bandwidth needed per node for
maintaining DataCube redundancy mechanism in presence
of churn. Each time a node p leaves the system data-items
or checked blocks p cached are copied over to new nodes
(to keep the redundancy guarantees), while each time a new
node p joins the system p needs to download all the data
that match to it. If we assume that nodes join the system
at rate λ and leave it at rate α, and that α = λ (to keep
the system size constant in average), the usage bandwidth
per core node is, in expectation, equal to twice the size of
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Figure 4: (a) This graph shows the required stretch factor for our solution (hybrid redundancy) and replication factor for the
full replication approach as a function of the number of nodes N in the system. The required availability is da = 0.99. The number
shown in brackets (i.e., 1 and 6) represents the number of redundant routes. (b) This graph shows the number of stored fragments
per node in DataCube, in a full replication approach, and pure rateless erasure coding one as a function of the size of the system
N. The replication factor used for the full replication approach is equal to 33 (see Figure 4(a)) while the stretch factor for pure coding
is equal to 10.
fragments a node houses times λ. Note that the rate at which
core members leave the system is 1/ Sminlog2(N)−Smin less than
the one spare members do. Figure 5, derived from figures
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Figure 5: This graph shows the required bandwidth per node
as a function of the churn for maintaining up to 1000 TBytes
of unique data at an availability at least equal to 0.99.
obtained in Figure 4(b), shows the required bandwidth per
node needed for maintaining up to 1000 TBytes of unique
data in a system of N = 106 nodes (this corresponds to a
very large video archive). Clearly at a daily turnover rate, the
required redundancy policy is too demanding to be supported
by nodes, however, at a monthly turnover rate, continuous
contribution of each node shrinks to less than 20Kbytes/s
which is clearly compatible with classic ADSL rates.
V. RELATED WORK
Cataldi et al. [23] evaluate the encoding and decoding
time of Raptor and LT codes as a function of the size of
the original data by focusing on a failure free environment.
In [24], the authors provide a comprehensive performance
evaluation of open-source erasure coding libraries. Their
main goal has been to evaluate the trade-off between data
size and architectural features and memory behavior. Al-
though the codes they evaluate are not rateless (and thus
do not strictly apply to our study), their results show that
codes performance highly depend on the characteristics of
the machines. They show that 64-bit machines are well
tailored for XOR operations, or that the size of the blocks
should be carefully chosen according to the cache bahavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the present work, we have evaluated the efficiency of
DataCube, a P2P persistent data storage platform guaran-
teeing durable access and integrity of data despite collusion
of malicious nodes. The evaluation we have performed has
shown that parameters selection impacts codes performance.
In particular we have shown the benefit of judiciously col-
lecting check blocks. Regarding our evaluation of DataCube
in a severe adversarial environment we have shown the
benefit of hybrid replication over full replication in terms
of data availability, storage overhead and bandwidth usage.
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